ABSTRACT. This paper shows the robust non existence of competitive equilibria even in a simple three period representative agent economy with dynamically inconsistent preferences. We distinguish between a sophisticated and naive representative agent. Even when underlying preferences are monotone and convex, at given prices we show by example that the induced preference of the sophisticated representative agent over choices in first period markets is both non convex and satiated. Even allowing for negative prices, the market clearing allocation is not contained in the convex hull of demand. Finally, with a naive representative agent, we show that perfect foresight is incompatible with market clearing and individual optimization at given prices. JEL Classification: D50, D91.
INTRODUCTION
Starting from Strotz (1956) , choice problems with dynamically inconsistent preferences have been studied extensively 1 . There is a small but growing literature that studies the properties of competitive equilibrium models with dynamically inconsistent preferences 2 . The representative agent economy is a particularly simple (and widely used) model in macroeconomics and finance where both issues of optimization and market clearing arise 3 . This paper shows the robust non existence of competitive equilibria even in a simple deterministic three period representative agent economy with dynamically inconsistent preferences. We distinguish between a naive and sophisticated representative agent. We formulate the decision problem of a sophisticated representative agent as an intrapersonal game at given prices. In our simple exchange economy there is only one candidate market clearing allocation, namely one in which the representative agent consumes his endowments. We show, via a robust example, that there are no prices such that, at the solution of the intra-personal game, the representative agent consumes his endowments.
The models of Barro (1999) , Kocherlakota (2001) and Luttmer and Mariotti (2003) allow for the possibility of quasi-hyperbolic discounting: under the key assumption that agents have identical discount functions and identical CRRA period utility functions, whether discounting is quasi-hyperbolic is irrelevant and existence is not an issue. Closer to the work reported here, Luttmer and Mariotti (2006) , Herings and Rohde (2006) , Luttmer and Mariotti (2007) have shown that equilibria exist with general classes of dynamically inconsistent preferences 4 .
1 Pollak (1968) , Blackorby, Nissen, Primont, and Russell (1973) , Peleg and Yaari (1973) , Goldman (1980) , Harris and Laibson (2001) , Caplin and Leahy (2006) among others.
2 Barro (1999) , Kocherlakota (2001) , Luttmer and Mariotti (2003) , Luttmer and Mariotti (2006) , Herings and Rohde (2006) , Luttmer and Mariotti (2007) , Herings and Rohde (2008) . 3 Caplin and Leahy (2001), Kocherlakota (2001) , Luttmer and Mariotti (2003) , among others, introduce dynamically inconsistent preferences in the representative agent economy. 4 Observe that the preferences studied in Luttmer and Mariotti (2006) and Luttmer and Mariotti (2007) satisfy quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laibson (1997) ) and are, by construction, time separable. In Herings and Rohde (2006) , preferences are independent of past consumption (like the preferences studied by us here) but, unlike us, they study existence in a market structure that is not sequentially complete.
In our example the dynamically inconsistent preferences that we study do not satisfy the assumption of time separability 5 and result in induced preferences over choices in first period markets that are non convex and satiated. At given prices, in our example, such induced preferences display satiation because the amount consumed by the second period "self"is a decreasing function of the amount saved by the first period "self". Further, at given prices, the induced preferences over first period choices fail to be convex as anticipated second and third period consumption are no longer concave functions of first period savings. We show that the market clearing allocation does not lie in the convex hull of demand even allowing for negative prices and hence the non-existence result. 6 Finally, with a naive representative agent, we show that perfect foresight is incompatible with market clearing and individual optimization. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we introduce the three period representative agent economy, in section 3 we present the non existence example with a sophisticated representative agent, while in section 4 we study existence with a naive representative agent.
THE ECONOMY
We consider a simple representative agent economy over three periods, labeled by t, t = 1, 2, 3. There is a single asset (the tree) which delivers units of a consumption good (dividends or fruit) in every period. The consumption good is non storable, hence the asset provides the only way to transfer wealth across periods. Let c t denote consumption in period t, t = 1, 2, 3. Let θ t+1 denote the amount of the asset held by the representative agent at the beginning of period t + 1. Then θ t+1 d t+1 denotes the amount of the consumption good available for consumption at t + 1.
5
See Caplin and Leahy (2001) . Among other specific properties, their model features both uncertainty and non-time separable preferences in an intrinsic way. As our analysis is limited to the deterministic case, we focus on the implications of nontime separable preferences that such a model may have. Time separability will also be violated in models of habit persistence although we do not explicitly focus on this case in this paper. 6 Luttmer and Mariotti (2006), Herings and Rohde (2006) , Luttmer and Mariotti (2007) deal only with potential non convexities, but not with satiation. Herings and Rohde (2006) prove existence in the case in which induced preferences are convex by assumption. Luttmer and Mariotti (2006) and Luttmer and Mariotti (2007) prove existence in a large economy by proving that there exist prices such that the market clearing allocation lies in the convex hull of demand.
We assume the representative agent is a price taker for both the consumption good and the asset. We normalize prices so that the price of the consumption good is fixed at 1 in each period, with p t denoting the relative price of the asset in period t. The model is completely deterministic and the values of all fundamentals are known from the beginning by the agent. At the beginning of period 1, the agent is endowed with the entire asset (θ 1 = 1) and the entire paid dividend d 1 .
At each t, we assume that the agent has preferences ranking non negative commodity bundles. We assume that at each t, t = 1, 2, the preferences of the representative agent over consumption are represented by the utility function u t (c t , ..., c 3 ). We assume that at each t, t = 1, 2 u t (c t , ..., c 3 )
7 is smooth, strictly increasing and strictly quasi-concave. We say preferences are dynamically inconsistent if given some non-negative c 1 the projection of preferences of the representative agent at t = 1 over (c 2 , c 3 ) ∈ R 2 + are different from his preferences at t = 2 over (c 2 , c 3 ) ∈ R 2 + , or equivalently, for some non-negative c 1 ,
In the remainder of the paper we assume that the preferences of the representative agent are dynamically inconsistent.
We consider the case where the representative agent is sophisticated, i.e. correctly anticipates that at t = 2 he will re-optimize, given his choices made at t = 1. At given prices p t , t = 1, 2, the decision problem of the sophisticated representative agent is described by the following intra-personal game:
Players: each period t, t = 1, 2, the representative agent is considered as a distinct autonomous player. Actions: A t = {(c t , θ t+1 ) ∈ R 2 + : c t + p t θ t+1 ≤ (p t + d t )θ t } constitutes the set of actions available to player t. Histories: the set of possible histories at t = 2 is H 1 = A 1 , while the set of histories at t = 1, H 0 is a singleton. Strategies: a strategy for the date t consumer is a Borel measurable function
Clearly, as u 1 (.) depends on c 1 , c 2 and c 3 but u 2 (.) depends on c 2 and c 3 but not c 1 , the preferences studied here are consistent with anticipatory feelings but not with habit persistence.
8
As preferences are monotonic over consumption in each period, the optimal period 3 choice is to always choose maximum feasible consumption. It follows that the asset price in period 3 is zero. In this 3 period economy our exclusive focus is on the time inconsistency between periods 1 and 2. Remark. From definition 1, at given prices, it follows that a SS is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the intra-personal game, although, in general, the converse does not hold. In general, the two solution concepts would not coincide if there are multiple payoff maximizing consumption choices in some subgame for the period-2 consumer. However in our economy, as the second period utility is strictly quasiconcave guaranteeing a unique solution in each subgame, the two solution concepts coincide.
The market clearing condition for this economy is trivial: the agent must hold the entire unit of the asset in each period (θ 1 = θ 2 = θ 3 = 1) and consumption must be equal to the entire dividend paid in each period (
Definition 2. A competitive equilibrium with a sophisticated representative agent is a combination of prices
Note that by construction at a competitive equilibrium with a sophisticated representative agent both selves of the representative agent face the same prices, i.e. the sophisticated representative agent at t = 1 must correctly forecast the asset price at t = 2. The definition of a competitive equilibrium with a sophisticated agent corresponds to the notion of a sophisticated equilibrium in Herrings and Rhode (2006) and to the notion of a competitive equilibrium in Luttmer and Mariotti (2006) .
A weaker definition of competitive equilibrium with a sophisticated representative agent would allow for the possibility that the market clearing allocation lies in the convex hull of demand. To this end, at prices p 1 , p 2 , given a strategy γ, we define the demand correspondence:
is an outcome of SS at prices (p 1 , p 2 )}. Even though preferences are strictly quasi-concave, the demand correspondence can be multi-valued in our setting as the induced preferences of the sophisticated representative agent at t = 1 may fail to be convex. Let Conv(D(p 1 , p 2 )) denote the convex hull of the demand correspondence i.e. the intersection of all convex sets containing D(p 1 , p 2 ; γ). A weaker notion of a competitive equilibrium follows:
Definition 3. A weak competitive equilibrium with a sophisticated representative agent is a combination of prices
At a weak competitive equilibrium with a sophisticated representative agent, as the market clearing allocation lies in the convex hull of the demand, market clearing is only obtained in expectation (equivalently, market clearing obtains in a reinterpretation of our model where the representative agent is a collection of a continuum of identical individuals).
Proposition 1. (Non existence). Not only does a competitive equilibrium with a sophisticated representative agent not always exist but even a weak competitive equilibrium with a sophisticated representative agent does not always exist.
In the following section we prove the proposition with a robust example.
AN EXAMPLE OF NON EXISTENCE
In this section we construct a robust example, where utility is increasing, smooth and strictly quasi-concave, but where a competitive equilibrium with a sophisticated representative agent does not exist. In this example at any fixed configuration of asset prices, by backward induction, the representative agent at t = 1 anticipates how the demand of his future self at t = 2 for θ 3 varies as a function of the amount of θ 2 he chooses to hold. The resulting induced preferences over θ 2 at t = 1 are nonconvex and satiated. We, then, show that there is no market clearing asset price at t = 1 for such an induced preference.
The non-existence result is due to the fact that, in our example, consumption does not always increase monotonically in wealth. In order to have a well behaved utility function such that consumption may be an inferior good over certain ranges of wealth, we use the addilog preferences which have been introduced by Houthakker (1960) . 9 We begin by specifying the utility function at each t for the representative agent. At t = 1 the utility function of the representative agent is:
Concavity of the single period utility functions together with time separability imply that every period consumption is a normal good. In our example this is not always the case as the period 2 player's preferences are not time separable.
where b ∈ (0, 1), c ∈ (0, 1) and b > c. We assume that the utility function of the representative agent at t = 2 generates the following indirect addilog utility function:
where θ 2 (p 2 + d 2 ) is the wealth of the representative agent at t = 2 and p 2 /d 3 is the price of consumption at t = 3, c 3 = θ 3 d 3 . 10 This class of indirect utility functions was introduced by Houthakker (1960) . Expression (2) draws on the work of Murthy (1982) . Consistent with his assumptions we assume that the underlying preference and wealth parameters take the following values:
de Boer, Bröcker, Jensen, and van Daal (2006) formally prove that when the β ′ s are strictly greater than -1 and the α's add up to 1 the indirect utility function satisfies the following properties: (i) homogeneous of degree zero in p 2 and θ 2 , (ii) non-increasing in p 2 and nondecreasing in θ 2 , (iii) strictly quasi-convex in p 2 , (iv) differentiable in p 2 and θ 2 . The fact that the indirect utility function is strictly quasi-convex in prices implies that the direct utility function, i.e. the dual of (2), is strictly quasi-concave by a well known result in duality theory 11 . Next we compute the asset demand functions at t = 2. Given that the utility function at t = 2 is strictly quasi-concave, we can apply Roy's Lemma and obtain:
It follows that as the period 2 budget constraint is satisfied with the equality, the demand for θ 3 at t = 2 as a function of θ 2 , p 2 is
10
Since the optimal period 3 choice is to always choose maximum feasible consumption, without loss of generality, the asset price in period 3 is zero.
11
See for example Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) , page 66.
Re-expressing c 1 , c 2 and c 3 through the three inter-temporal budget constraints (satisfied in each case as an equality) and using d 1 = d 2 = d 3 = 1, we obtain the period 1 indirect utility function:
Lemma 1. The market clearing price at t = 2 such that θ * 2 = θ * 3 = 1 is p * 2 = 18.7.
Proof. At the market clearing price vector it must be optimal for the representative agent to demand θ * 2 = θ * 3 = 1. Using equation (4), we look for the p 2 such that the representative agent demands the market clearing quantities c 2 = d 2 , θ 2 = 1. Given the specified values β 2 = −0.5, β 3 = 1, α 2 = 0.2, α 3 = 0.8, d 2 = 1 we obtain the following equation:
Given that the utility function of the representative agent at t = 2 is strongly monotone, the market clearing price at t = 2 must be positive. There exists only one positive solution to (7), namely p * 2 = 18.7 and this is the market clearing price at t = 2.
The preceding lemma computes the unique second period asset price that supports the market clearing allocation as the optimal choice of a period-2 consumer.
Lemma 2. There exists a K strictly positive such that whenever b/c > K then
Proof. Plugging the values of the parameters and p * 2 = 18.7 into (4) we can re-express the demand for c 2 at t = 2, given p * 2 = 18.7, as a function of θ 2 :
By computation note that
, where h = .88,y = .84, z = .04.
Notice that hy is strictly positive as it is the denominator of the fraction, however as 2z < y, for θ 2 ≥ 1, θ 3/2 2 − 2z y > 0. Hence, c 2 is an inferior good at t = 2 over some range of income.
Substituting the expression for c 2 (θ 2 , p * 2 ) into (5) and (6) we obtain the period 1 indirect utility as a function of p 1 and θ 2 alone:
where h ≡ .88, y ≡ .84, z ≡ .04.
where k ≡ 1.05, x ≡ .047, y ≡ .84, z ≡ .04. By computation notice that as long as p 1 ≥ 0,
Hence, B = b ln(hf (θ 2 )) and C = c ln(kθ 2 − xf (θ 2 )). Now
.
Under the values of the parameters assumed so far, (k − xf ′ (θ 2 )) > 0 and kθ 2 − xf (θ 2 ) > 0 ∀ θ 2 ≥ 1. Therefore, ∂B ∂θ 2 < 0 and ∂C ∂θ 2 > 0 for all θ 2 ≥ 1 i.e. second period consumption is an inferior good and third period consumption a normal good for the period-1 consumer. Further,
By substitution and simplification, it follows that
As long as θ 2 ≥ 1, the denominator of K(θ 2 ) is bounded away from zero so that for any finite value of θ 2 ≥ 1, K(θ 2 ) is bounded. Let
By computation,
. Now, (3/2)yθ
that there exists a K strictly positive, such that at any p 1 ≥ 0, whenever b/c > K,
The preceding lemma establishes that, at any positive first period asset price, the (indirect) marginal utility of the period-1 consumer in θ 2 , evaluated at p * 2 , is negative whenever θ 2 ≥ 1. Observe that we have to consider unbounded values of θ 2 in lemma 2 as we allow for the possibility that p 2 = 0.
In the next lemma we will allow for a negative asset price at t = 1. Observe that the reason for this is implicit in the calculations underlying lemma 2: it is that for each p 1 ≥ 0, V 1 (p 1 , θ 2 ) attains a maximum at some value θ 2 < 1. Note that in this case with p 1 < 0 the budget constraint at t = 1 is: θ 2 ≥ 1 + d 1 /p 1 − c 1 /p 1 , which imposes a lower bound on θ 2 . Lemma 3. There exists a K strictly positive such that whenever b/c > K, (a) there exists p * 1 < 0 such that
Proof. By computation observe that
. By lemma 2
Using the expressions derived in lemma 2, 
Lemma shows that at the unique period one asset price p * 1 (so that choosing θ 2 = 1 satisfies the first-order condition characterizing an interior optima holds) also has the property that the marginal (indirect) utility of holding an extra unit of the period one asset is also strictly positive for large values of θ 2 . In the following lemma, we show that that θ 2 = 1 is never an optimal choice even allowing for a negative asset price at t = 1. In addition we also show that θ 2 = 1 does not belong to the convex hull of demand even allowing for a negative asset price at t = 1. The latter statement implies that, even if we re-interpret the model so that the representative agent is a collection of a continuum of identical individuals, equilibrium existence is not restored.
Lemma 4. Given lemmas 1, 2, 3, θ 2 = 1 is not an element of the convex hull of demand even allowing for a negative asset price at t = 1 so that neither a competitive equilibrium, nor a weak competitive equilibrium, with a sophisticated representative agent exists.
Proof. Lemma 1 implies that with a sophisticated representative agent there is a unique p * 2 candidate equilibrium price at period 2. For an equilibrium to exist, given p * 2 , there must be a p * 1 such that for the representative agent θ * 2 = 1 is a SS. There are two cases to consider. 1. p 1 ≥ 0: fix a (p 1 , p * 2 ), p 1 ≥ 0, by lemma 2 θ 2 = 1 is never an optimal solution. Next, observe that a necessary condition for θ 2 = 1 to be in the convex hull of individual demand is that
2 ) = 0 for some θ ′′ 2 > 1, a possibility ruled out by lemma 2. It follows that θ 2 = 1 is not in the convex hull of individual demand.
2. p 1 < 0: by lemma 3, in order to ensure that θ 2 = 1 is chosen at t = 1 it necessarily follows that the only candidate equilibrium price is p 1 = p * 1 . Further by lemma 3 there exists θ 2 > 1 such that for all θ 2 > θ 2 ,
It follows that at prices (p * 1 , p * 2 ), θ 2 = 1 cannot be an optimal choice for the representative agent.
It remains to check that θ 2 = 1 is not in the convex hull of demand when p 1 < 0. By computation, observe that for anyθ 2 > 1, a necessary condition forθ 2 to be an optimal choice is that p 1 = p * 1 (θ 2 ) = ∂(B+C) ∂θ 2 |θ 2 < 0. Moreover using arguments analogous to lemma 3, it is verified that lim
Therefore, there is no p 1 < 0 for which there is somê θ 2 > 1 such thatθ 2 is an optimal choice. It follows that θ 2 = 1 cannot be in the convex hull of individual demand.
Note that the above non existence result is robust to small variations in parameter values by the continuity of the derivatives of the utility functions in these parameters. Remarks. The feature that implies the nonexistence result in our example is the fact that period 2 consumption is an inferior good from the perspective of the period 2 decision maker, but it is a normal good from the perspective of the period 1 decision maker and this implies that the period 1 consumer demand for period 2 wealth, i.e. for θ 2 , is satiated. The papers of Luttmer and Mariotti (2006) , Herings and Rohde (2006) , Luttmer and Mariotti (2007) are able to prove existence because the issue of inferior goods and satiation and does not arise in their papers. With sequentially complete markets, concavity of the single period utility functions together with time separability imply that both c 2 and c 3 are normal goods for the period 2 consumer and this is enough to avoid satiation in period 1, because if both c 2 and c 3 increase in θ 2 , then for the period 1 consumer utility monotonically increases in θ 2 . In such a situation, the existence of an equilibrium price p * 1 such that the period 1 market clearing quantity θ 2 = 1 belongs to the convex hull of the demand correspondence can be proved with a standard fixed point argument.
12 A necessary condition to reestablish the existence of the competitive equilibrium allowing for a large number of identical consumers is that there is at least one optimal quantity θ ′ 2 which is smaller than the market clearing quantity θ 2 = 1 and at least one optimal quantity θ ′′ 2 which is greater. In our example, allowing for a large large number of identical consumers does not successfully reestablish the existence of a competitive equilibrium because, for any positive p 1 , (8) decreases in θ 2 for all θ 2 ≥ 1 and this implies that θ 2 = 1 cannot belong to the convex hull of the demand function. This happens because c 2 is an inferior commodity for all θ 2 ≥ 1 and, given the values of the discount factors b and c, the cost of a marginal decrease in c 2 is greater than the benefit of a marginal increase in c 3 for the period 1 decision maker.
Negative prices can generally reestablish the existence of a competitive equilibrium which fails to exist because of satiation, when free disposal is not allowed, as it happens in our example. In the case of negative p 1 , the period 1 budget constraint is: θ 2 ≥ 1 + d 1 /p 1 − c 1 /p 1 , i.e. with a negative p 1 there is no upper bound on the quantity of θ 2 which the consumer can demand and there is instead a lower bound. We have proved that any negative p 1 cannot re-establish the competitive equilibrium in our example showing that, given any negative p 1 , the unique optimal choice for the period 1 consumer is to demand a quantity of θ 2 which goes to +∞ implying non-vanishing excess demand.
EQUILIBRIUM WITH NAIVE AGENTS
In this section we study equilibria with a naive representative agent.
12
The convex hull of the individual excess of demand of the period 1 consumer is convex (trivial) and has a closed graph (implied by the upper hemicontinuity and compact-valuedness of the demand function and the monotonicity of the preference for θ 2 ). Fix p t , t = 1, 2. When the representative agent is naive at t = 1, he does not anticipate that at t = 2 consumption and asset choices will be re-optimized. Therefore at t = 1 the representative agent solves max (c 1 ,c 2 ,c 3 ,θ 2 ,θ 3 ) u 1 (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) subject to: (9)
Letĉ t (p 1 , p 2 ), t = 1, 2, 3 andθ t (p 1 , p 2 ), t = 2, 3 denote the unique solution (if it exists) to the preceding maximization problem.
At t = 2 the representative agent solves
subject to: (10)
With a slight abuse of notation, the unique solution (if it exists) to the preceding maximization problem is denoted byc t (p 2 ,θ 2 (p 1 , p 2 )) =c t (p 1 , p 2 ), t = 2, 3 andθ 3 (p 2 ,θ 2 (p 1 , p 2 )) = θ 3 (p 1 , p 2 ).
We say preferences are strongly dynamically inconsistent if for all non-negative c 1 the preferences of the representative agent at t = 1 over (c 2 , c 3 ) ∈ R 2 + are different from his preferences at t = 2 over (c 2 , c 3 ) ∈ R 2 + , or equivalently, for all non-negative c 1 , , (c 2 , c 3 )∈ R 2 + .
13
The assumption that in every period the utility function is strictly monotone in consumption implies that inter-temporal budget constraints are satisfied at equalities in either maximization problem. As before, in a competitive equilibrium, it must be optimal for both selves of the naive representative agent to hold the entire unit of 13 An example of a utility function satisfying this stronger definition would be one where there is a systematic shift in marginal rates of substitution between c 2 , c 3 when the representative agent enters period 2, for example, u 1 (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) = log c 1 + log c 2 + log c 3 and u 2 (c 2 , c 3 ) = 2 log c 2 + log c 3 .
, p
′′ 2 ) and θ
The definition of a perfect foresight competitive equilibrium with a naive agent is new. The definition of a temporary competitive equilibrium corresponds to the notion of a naive equilibrium in Herings and Rohde (2006) . The following proposition establishes that although a perfect foresight competitive equilibrium with a naive representative agent does not exist, a temporary competitive equilibrium does.
Proposition 2. A perfect foresight competitive equilibrium with a naive representative agent does not exists, however a temporary competitive equilibrium does.
Proof. At t = 1 as the utility function u t () of the representative agent is smooth and strictly concave,θ 2 =θ 3 = 1 if and only if asset prices satisfy the following equations:
Next, observe that at t = 2,θ 3 = 1 if and only if asset prices satisfy the following equations:
As preferences are strongly dynamically inconsistent 
